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successful, they also provide acontractarianjustification
for morally criticizing the practice of factory farming,
though this is meant merely as one example. Second,
without attempting to settle the question of precisely
which additional restrictions on our treatment ofanimals
such contractarian arguments might ultimately be used
to underwrite, I will argue that whatever principles are
finally agreed to, they involve attributing to animals a
moral standing that is just as "full" as the moral status
such arguments accord to some humans.
I.

In bis recent contribution to the literature on the moral
status of animals, Peter Carruthers argues that "some
version of contractualism provides us with the most
acceptable framework for moral theory," and be defends
two central claims about sucb a theory: that it provides
"a theoretical framework that accords full moral
standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily
withholding such standing from animals," and that it
can account for many common-sense beliefs about the
treatment of animals, while at the same time providing
"no support for those who would wish to extend still
further the moral protection already available" to them.'
I am not concemed here to question the merits either
of contractarian 2 moral theory in general, or of
Carruthers' version of it in particular. Instead, I want to
grant the acceptability of such a theory for the sake of
the argument, and to challenge Carruthers' two crucial
claims about it. First, I will argue that if moral
contractarianism provides support for common-sense
restrictions on our treatment of animals for the sorts of
reasons that Carruthers develops, then it provides
support for extending moral protection substantially
beyond the level currently available to them; I will
argue, in particular, that if Carruthers' arguments are
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Acontraetualistmoral theory, as Carruthers uses the tenn,
is one which "views morality as the result ofan imaginary
contract between rational agents, who are agreeing upon
rules to govern their subsequent behavior," and which
attempts "to justify a system of moral principles by
showing that they would be agreed upon by rational
agents in certain ideal circumstances" (pp. 35-36). The
best-known version of such a theory remains that of Jobn
Rawls, in which the ideal circumstances requisite for
ensuring impartiality are generated by endowing rational
agents with general knowledge of the social sciences and
then placing them behind a "veil of ignorance" which
keeps them from knowing facts about their particular
characteristics and circumstances. Rawls is himself
primarily concemed to apply this method to the problem
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of political justice, but Carruthers rightly notes that it
can be extended to provide a general theory of morality:
morality consists of those rules governing human conduct
which would be agreed to by agents placed in such ideal
circumstances. 3
Carruthers expresses some concern that contractualist moral theory not be identified exclusively witb
its Rawlsian version, and so notes that on tbe view
developed by Thomas Scanlon, tbe agents involved are
allowed tbe sort of knowledge of their particular
situation wbich is ruled out in Rawls' version. The
account of morality, on this view, is that "moral rules
are those that no one could reasonably reject as a basis
for free, unforced, general agreement amongst people
who share the aim of reaching such an agreement" (p.
38). But Carruthers suggests that tbe idealizations
exploited by Scanlon achieve the same effect as Rawls'
veil of ignorance,4 and he continues to employ this
Rawlsian device in his own discussions of contractualism in general. I will follow Carruthers, then, in
characterizing the contractarian theory of morality as
one on which the rules of morality are those which
would be selected by rational agents from behind a veil
of ignorance. And I want to follow Carruthers in asking
two questions: what is the content of the principles
regulating our treatment of animals which would be
agreed to under such conditions? And how does tbe moral
status which is conferred to animals by the acceptance
of such principles differ from the moral status which is
conferred on some humans by the acceptance of
principles regulating our treatment of them?

will instead argue that if they are accepted, then,
contrary to Carruthers, there is no good reason toprevent
them from being used to justify moral restrictions on
our treatment of animals which go substantially beyond
those which are presently accepted.
Carruthers' first argument concerns the great distress
which causing an animal to suffer in turn causes to those
humans who care deeply about the well-being of
animals. Causing such distress by causing an animal to
suffer for trivial reasons, Carruthers says, "would violate
the right of animal lovers to have their concerns
respected and taken seriously" (p. 107). And since wellinfonned rational agents can expect that there will be
many people who will have such concerns, "this may
place on us an obligation not to cause suffering to
animals, except for powerful reasons" (p. 106).
Although Carruthers does not put it in this way, the
point might best be understood as follows: as a rational
agent behind a veil of ignorance, I do not know whether
I will be one of those people who don't mind kicking a
dog for trivial reasons or one of those who are deeply
grieved by seeing another doing so. But because I expect
tbe loss to me from such actions being morally permitted
if I tum out to be a dog-lover to be greater than the gain
to me if I prove to be a dog-hater, I do best by agreeing
to a principle which would morally condemn a person
for kicking a dog for trivial reasons. Reasoning under
conditions of uncertainty, that is, I must cboose the
outcome with the best worse-case results, and it will be
better to be a slightly inconvenienced dog-hater than a
deeply-distressed dog-Iover. 6
Carruthers takes it that sucb an argument succeeds
in equipping contractarianism with the ability to
accommodate some of our common-sense views about
the treatment of animals. But he insists that the
argument, if accepted, cannot be extended to criticize
such practices as painful methods of factory farming
or of testing new commercial products on animals
"even granting that the purposes subserved by such
activities (cheaper meat, and new varieties of
shampoo) are trivial." And his reason for this is that
the constraints generated by this argument "would only
apply to suffering that occurs in a manner that is
unavoidably public":

II.

Carruthers develops two distinct arguments to show that
rational agents choosing principles of conduct from
behind a veil of ignorance would accept some
restrictions on their treatment of animals. This is
important, on Carruthers' account, because if it could
be shown that sucb agents would embrace a code of
behavior which imposed no limits at all on their
treatment of animals, this would likely be taken as too
strongly counterintuitive to allow the theory as a whole
to achieve a position of reflective equilibrium. It is
possible, of course, that Carruthers' two arguments5 for
the acceptance of such restrictions will be found to be
unconvincing, and that his defense of contractarianism
will be rejected as implausible for that very reason. I
will not offer any defense of his arguments here, but
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For it Seems that one can legitimately reply to
those who complain of such activities [e.g.,
factory farming] in exactly the way that one
would reply to those who are distressed by
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unusual sexual practices, for example. One can
say: 'If it upsets you, don't think about it.'
While granting that an unusual sexual practice
(or the suffering of an animal) should not be
flaunted in public, because of the offence this
may occasion, it seems there can be no
objection to it occurring in private (p. 107).

into account in my deliberations from behind the veil
of ignorance. But in this case, surely, the cost to me
will be far greater if I tum out to be a homosexual who
finds himself prohibited from pursuing sexual
fulfillment, and so from behind the veil of ignorance, I
will agree to accept principles which deem private
homosexual intercourse to be morally unobjectionable.
In both cases, then, the contractarian cannot simply
ignore the costs to those who fmd themselves distressed
by their thoughts of what others are permitted to do in
private, nor can ilie weight of iliose costs justifiably be
discounted. Sometimes they will be greater than ilie
benefits to others and sometimes not, and so the
restrictions which are grounded in ilie distress caused
in this manner will have to be assessed by the
contracting agents on a case by case basis.
Now two objections might be raised at this point.
One is that in attempting to sever the case of
homosexuality from the case of factory farming, I have
underestimated how deeply disturbed many people
will be by the thought iliat oiliers are morally permitted
to engage in homosexual intercourse in ilie privacy of
their own homes. Perhaps their stress will be so great
as to outweigh ilie cost to homosexuals of prohibiting
their pursuit of sexual fulfillment. The oilier is iliat,
even if I am right in iliis particular case, iliere will
still be many other instances of private behavior in
which ilie trivial benefits to ilie participants will be
less than ilie cost in distress to iliose who disapprove,
so that we will have to accept moral restrictions on
many forms of private behavior typically thought to
be morally unobjectionable. But these considerations,
if established, would show only that a contractarian of
the sort Carruthers has in mind would be forced to
conclude that such forms of behavior are immoral. This
might count as an objection to iliis sort of contractarianism itself, but it does nothiI 6 to undermine the
claim that this is how such a contractarian should weigh
the costs of distress in determining which rules would
be chosen by rational agents deliberating from behind
a veil of ignorance. It may well be that there are
compelling reasons not to accept as moral ilie rules
which agents would choose in such circumstances. My
claim here has simply been iliat if we allow such agents
to consider the distress caused to individuals by tlJeir
knowledge of public harm to animals caused for trivial
reasons, ilien there is no good reason to prevent them
from considering the distress caused to those who fmd
iliemselves upset by tlJeir knowledge that similar harms

Now on many views of morality, it is indeed
perfectly legitimate to reply to people who are distressed
by the thought of what others do in the privacy of their
own homes simply by saying, "if it upsets you, don't
think about it." But the question is whether this can be
a legitimate reply on the sort of contractarian account
which Carruthers seems to envision. And it seems that
it cannot. If people do think about it, and if thinking
about it does upset them, then the fact of their distress
is just as good a reason not to harm the animal in private
as it was a reason not to harm it in public (after all, even
in the case of witnessing a public beating, one could be
admonished not to think about it). Indeed, it is the very
same reason: choosing rules of conduct from behind a
veil of ignorance, I do not know if I will be a person
who gains some marginal advantage by producing meat
sauce instead of tomato sauce or one who finds that she
cannot avoid thinking about the great suffering animals
must endure to provide such trivial benefits and who is
greatly distressed as a result. In the absence of such
knowledge, I decline to risk the greater cost, which is
the serious distress ratller than the trivial benefit, and
so agree to a rule which would condemn the causing of
such suffering in private as well as public places.
This analysis of the case of causing an animal to
suffer away from IDe public view also reveals the crucial
disanalogy between the examples of animal suffering
and nonstandard sexual practices, a disanalogy which
Carruthers overlooks entirely. Consider, for example,
the question of whether private homosexual intercourse
should be morally condemned. From behind the veil of
ignorance, I do not know if I will be a homosexual or a
person who is disturbed by the knowledge that other
people engage in homosexual intercourse in the privacy
of their own homes. Again, from the cOl1tractarian
perspective, I cannot simply tell myself that if I am the
latter sort of person I should simply be told to stop
thinking about it, because such a person does think about
it and does find himself distressed as a result. So the
cost which will be imposed on me if I find myself tlle
sort of person who has such thoughts must be taken
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are allowed to be inflicted on animals in private. The
distress caused to those concerned about the pains
inflicted on animals in factory fanning is great and the
benefits to those who benefit trivial,? so if Carruthers'
argument from distress provides a reason to suppose
that rational agents behind a veil of ignorance would
accept any restrictions on their treatment of animals at
all, then it also provides a reason, and an equally
convincing reason, to suppose that they would agree to
condemn factory fanning. s

the agents doing the evaluating from behind the veil of
ignorance would criticize the absence of sympathy for
animals on the grounds that it represented a potential
threat to other people. So the contractarian may have a
way to justify restrictions on our treatment of animals
that is independent ofappeals to the distress such actions
may cause in animal lovers.
As with Carruthers' first argument, I am again
concerned not to assess the merits of the argument itself,
but to ask whether, if it is admitted, there are any good
reasons to refuse to extend it beyond the limited
restrictions on our treatment of animals which are
already generally accepted, and in particular whether
there are reasons not to extend it to a moral criticism of
factory farming. Carruthers maintains that this
argument, like the previous one, cannot be so extended,
again granting that the social benefits offactory farming
are themselves trivial. His reason is this: whether or
not an act displays a defect of character depends on the
circumstances and the motive from which it is
performed. It is only when a person causes an animal
to suffer for trivial reasons that he reveals a lack of
sympathy that will be worrisome to the imagined
rational contractors. And in the case of people who
inflict pain on animals in their work on a factory fann,
"the motives from which the people in question are
acting are by no means trivial, since they are earning a
livelihood."

m.
Carruthers' second argument for the claim that rational
agents behind a veil of ignorance would accept
restrictions on their treatment of animals rests on the
importance that such agents would attach to the
development of good character. Since people often act
from general dispositions and not strictly from
deliberate adherence to explicitly formulated principles,
Carruthers argues, such agents would agree not only to
endorse the merits of certain rules of conduct, but also
to encourage the development of those dispositions and
traits of character which would best ensure compliance
with them. In particular, he urges, such agents would
likely agree to accept not only duties ofnon-interference
with others, but also duties of assistance, and the most
reasonable account of such duties would require each
person "to develop a general disposition to help those
in need, to be exercised when the opportunity arises to
do so at no comparable cost to themselves." They would
agree, in other words, to develop "a general attachment
to the good of others" (p. 152), which would in turn
commit them to trying "to develop a ready sympathy
for one another's suffering" (p. 154),
And this in tum, Carruthers argues, would provide
the basis for condemning acts which cause suffering to
animals for trivial reasons (or for no reason at all or for
their own sake). "Such actions," he argues, "are wrong
because they are cruel. They betray an indifference to
suffering that may manifest itself... in that person's
dealings with otherrational agents" (pp. 153-54),9 This
is not to say that the contracting agents would want the
people themselves to believe that the reason for acting
kindly toward animals was that this was an effective
way of improving their prospects for acting kindly
toward other humans. The people being praised would
have a direct sympathetic response to the suffering of
animals, and the people being criticized would not. But
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There is thus no scope, here, for criticising the
overall practices offactory farming and animal
experimentation.... This point is important
because even if the reasons why we have such
practices are trivial-cheaper meat and new
varieties of cosmetics-the motives of those
who engage in them are not. There is then no
reason to claim that those people are cruel in
what they do (pp. 159-60).
There are two problems with this response. One is
that it seriously misrepresents the character from which
the worker on the factory fann acts. To point out that
such people earn a living at what they do suggests that
they act from the motive of earning a living, as if they
are faced with the choice of causing suffering to animals
for trivial social benefits and earning a living, or not
causing suffering to animals for trivial social benefits
and earning no living at all. This impression is
reinforced in the context of another argument, when
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Carrutbers writes tbat it is "too much to demand tbat
people should forgo employment out of respect for tbe
feelings of animal lovers" (p. 167). But the choice is
typically not between earning a living and not earning
a living, but between different ways of earning a living.
And given the existence of jobs with roughly
comparable demands and compensations, a preference
for the job which causes pain to animals for trivial social
benefits is itself trivial, and the motive from which one
acts in choosing to indulge such a preference is truly
indifferent to the suffering of animals. to
Now it may at this point be objected that in the real
world, workers do not always have their choice of
occupations and that a person may well be faced witb
the choice of taking a job that requires him to harm
animals for trivial social benefits and taking no job at
all. And surely in such cases, he acts from a nontrivial
motive in accepting such ajob. But the question which
the rational contractors behind the veil of ignorance
must face is precisely whether it would be best that this
be the sort of world in which they live. They must
decide, that is, whether the pool of jobs from which it
will be considered morally permissible to compete
should include some jobs which involve causing
suffering to animals for trivial social gains. Suppose
most people who presently work for factory fanus are
simply motivated by a desire to eanl a living. l1 Then
they will be equally satisfied if the agents choose amoral
system which demands that the resources currently
dedicated to factory faIms should instead be allocated
to creating other jobs which do not inHict pain on
animals for trivial social purposes. But suppose tbere
are a few who are motivated not by the desire to earn a
living, but by the desire to earn a living specifically by
inHicting serious hanns on animals for trivial social
gains. They, and only they, would be disappointed by
the absence of such jobs. But their motive, unlike the
motive of those who simply want to earn a living, is a
cruel one, one which betrays an indifference to the
suffering of animals. And so if Carruthers is right that
contracting agents behind a veil of ignorance will want
to minimize the flourishing of such motives, they will
choose a moral system which condemns allowing
resources to be allocated for the creation of the sorts of
jobs which could only be preferred by those with such
motives. So if the concern about chaI'acter which
Carruthers identifies is sufficient to justify condemning
those who harm animals from trivial moti\'~s, then it
will be sufficient to justify agreeing to the moral
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superiority of an economy in which people do not
compete for jobs which cause pain to animals for trivial
social benefits.
The second problem with Carruthers' attempt to
rescue factory farming from the implications of his
character-based argument is that he nowhere considers
the character of the people who buy and consume the
meat which makes tbe factory farm jobs possible. But
even if it is plausible to claim that the workers who
harm the animals act from nontrivial motives, it is not
plausible to claim that this is so of the consumers who
ultimately pay their salaries. The person who indulges
in a preference for meat lasagna instead of vegetable
lasagna does not act from the nontrivial motive ofeating
rather tban not eating, but from the trivial motive of
gaining an incremental increase in pleasure or
convenience. Unless he finds himself in extremely
unusual circumstances, in which factory-farmed meat
offers tbe only prospects for nourishment, the consumer
of the factory farm's products clearly acts from a motive
which is indifferent to tbe pain of animalsP And so
again, if Carruthers is right that contracting agents
behind tbe veil of ignorance would condemn behavior
which issues from such motives, then they would agree
to condemn those who purchase and eat factory-farmed
meat. And so even if such agents did not decide, as my
first objection suggested, to condemn the allocation of
resources to creating such meat-producing jobs in the
first place, they would still agree to endorse a set of
moral dispositions which would have the effect of
leaving the factory farm industry to wither away.
Now it might be objected to this last argument that
the consumer, unlike the factory-farm worker, betrays
no indifference to the pain of tbe animals if he does not
stand by and idly watch as tbe animals attempt to escape
or listen unaffected to their cries of pain. But if the
customer is truly not so indifferei . TO their suffering,
and so would be unwilling himself to participate in or
bear wilIless to such painful practices being carried out
simply for the sake of producing a slightly tastier meal,
then his purchase of tbe end result still betrays an
indifferent character. He is like the man who cannot
bring himself to murder his estranged wife but who can
witb peace of mind hire someone else to do it for him.
This is not to suggest, of course, that on the contractarian
account of morality hiring a hit man is to be equated
witb ordering chicken McNuggets. It is simply to say
that the relationship between doing something that
betrays an unacceptable character and paying to hhve
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someone else do it for you must be viewed as the same
in both cases. The contractarian will presumably want
to condemn the lack of sympathy of the person who
hires the hit man, even if the person is himself too
sensitive to inflict the hann himself. And so if Carruthers
is right to claim that contracting agents will criticize
people who cause pain to animals for trivial reasons,
then such agents will also have reason to criticize those
who enjoy the trivial benefits while paying others to
inflict the requisite pain. If the character-based argument
suffices to accommodate the common-sense views
which Carruthers wishes to accommodate, then it must
also underwrite a moral criticism of factory fanning.
Carruthers makes one further claim which might in
part be understood as a rebuttal to the attempt to extend
either the argument from distress to animal lovers or
the argument from the importance of character into a
moral criticism of factory fanning. This is the claim
that to do so would be to increase our concern with
animal welfare beyond its present level and that

and exhaustion of natural resources, and so would
choose to condemn it for that reason alone. And given
that this is a fairly wide-spread view of the social costs
of factory fanning, it is somewhat disappointing that
Carruthers does not address it. But there is a more
general point to be made here than this: if it is the case
that a great deal of valuable moral energy is currently
being used to attack factory fanning, this is surely
because so many people do not presently believe that
factory farming is morally objectionable. But the
rational agents behind the veil of ignorance are trying
precisely to decide which moral beliefs they think it
would be best for everyone to have. If I have been
successful in showing that the considerations Carruthers
would have them give weight to would lead these agents
to conclude that the best moral beliefs should include
the belief that factory fanning is objectionable, then no
energy would be wasted opposing factory fanning
because everyone would agree that it is wrong. People
do not currently devote their time to railing against the
immorality of murder, after all, since its wrongness is
generally recognized. Instead, they may worry about
how it can best be prevented. But while it is difficult to
determine how best to prevent crime or disease or
overpopulation or other serious human problems, it is
not difficult to determine how best to prevent factory
farming. Rational agents would recognize this
difference, and so would see no significant cost in terms
of valuable moral energy in accepting a principle which
condemned factory fanning. 14

the cost of increasing concern with animal
welfare is to distract attention from the needs
of those who certainly do have moral
standing-namely, human beings. We live on
a planet where millions of our fellow humans
starve, or are near starving, and where many
millions more are undernourished. In addition,
the twin perils of pollution and exhaustion of
natural resources threaten the futures of
ourselves and our descendants. It is here that
moral attention should be focused. Concern
with animal welfare, while expressive of
states of character that are admirable, is an
irrelevance to be opposed rather than
encouraged (p. 168).13

IV.
I have argued thus far that if rational agents behind a
veil of ignorance would have reason to accept
Carruthers' arguments for embracing moral principles
which place restrictions on their treatment of animals,
then they would also have reason to accept principles
which would extend moral protection to animals
substantially beyond the level generally accorded them.
If they agree to morally criticize individuals who harm
animals for trivial reasons, then they will also agree to
morally criticize social institutions and industries (and
the people who support them) which hann animals for
trivial social gains. I have used the case of factory
fanning as an example of this, since it is one which
Carruthers explicitly concedes to produce only trivial
benefits and claims to be morally unobjectionable, but
if my arguments have been sound, then the same

Carruthers acknowledges that one might object that
it is always possible to be concerned with both animal
and human welfare, but he protests that "in fact, much
of the moral energy currently spent in defense of animals
has been diverted from other domains." And this is
surely something that could not please rational agents
assessing our culture from behind a veil of ignorance.
Now it is tempting to respond to all of this, at least
in the case of factory farming, by claiming that wellinformed rational agents would be likely to conclude
that the inefficiency of factory fanning is an important
cause of the very problems of starvation, malnutrition,
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criterion would also be used to assess the use of animals
for entertainment, sport, clothing, product testing, and
so forth, as well as more "humane" methods of
converting them into food. There is obviously room here
for disagreement about which specific uses of animals
such agents would ultimately accept and which they
would reject, but I want now to assume that question
has been satisfactorily resolved. Some cases of hanning
animals will be morally criticized and some will not,
and some cases of hanning humans will be morally
criticized and some will not.

unattractive phrase "marginal humans") should
nonetheless be accorded direct moral standing on the
comractarian picture of morality. I want to argue that if
this is so, then so should animals.
Carruthers' main argument for according moral
standing to marginal humans l5 is a version of the slippery
slope argument. Contracting agents behind the veil of
ignorance might initially be tempted to agree to principles
which would attach moral standing only to rational agents
while withholding it from marginal humans. Such agents
are rational, after all, and so know that they will not
themselves be marginal humans, and they therefore have
no obvious reason to accord such humans direct moral
standing. But Carruthers argues that in choosing moral
principles, such agents must not only consider what the
principles themselves say, but must also "pay attention
to the ways in which those principles might be distorted
or abused" (p. 115). In particular, the contracting agents
will know that while there is a clear and easily-applied
distinction between humans and nonhumans, there is no
such sharp boundary between a human who barely
qualifies as a rational agent and a human who barely
doesn't. Moral principles which accord direct standing
to agents but not to marginal humans, then, "would be
inherently susceptible to abuse by unscrupulous people"
in a way that principles which accorded standing to
humans but not to nonhumans would not (p. 115).
Principles which relied on tenuous distinctions between
human agents and human patients could too readily be
used, for example, to convince people to deny rights to
those who are perceived to be sexually deviant, or
merely intellectually inferior, while principles which
relied on the clear and absolute distinction between
humans and nonhumans could not. To accept moral
principles which exclude marginal humans from direct
standing, these contracting agents would therefore
conclude, would be to agree to put themselves in a
position from which a slippery slope would easily lead
to "all kinds of barbarisms against those who are rational
agents" (p. 114).
Now one might think that the most an argument of
this sort could establish would be that rational agents
would agree to treat marginal humans as if they had
direct moral standing. They are convinced to accept the
theory which accords direct standing to marginal
humans, that is, not because they think that it is the
best theory to govern their interaction, but because they
worry that the theory that really is best (the one which
attributes direct standing only to agents) is too likely to

I want now to raise a question about the moral status
which is accorded to animals by virtue of accepting
these principles. Carruthers claims that moral
contractarianism can justify according full moral
standing to all humans while denying it to aU animals,
meaning that it can justify recognizing direct duties to
an humans and only indirect ones to animals. On the
face of it, this should seem surprising since only
rational agents can participate in the imagined
deliberations and not all humans are rational agents.
But Carruthers develops two arguments to show that
humans who are not rational agents (e.g., infants, the
severely retarded; for brevity, I will use the somewhat
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be abused in the real world. They accord direct standing
to marginal humans, then, not because they believe that
marginal humans really merit such standing, but because
they believe that it is convenient to accord such standing
to them. But Carruthers denies that, from the
contractarian point of view, there can be such a
distinction between saying that a being really merits
moral standing and saying that it is convenient to accord
it such standing (see pp. 116-17). Legitimate moral
principles just are those which rational agents choosing
from behind a veil of ignorance would accept. The
slippery slope argument shows that they would have
reason to accept principles on which all humans have
direct moral standing. So, on the contractarian account,
all humans do have direct moral standing.
Once again, I am not concerned to question the
merits of Carruthers' argument. But if it is accepted,
there is no clear reason why it should not be extended
to show that animals, too, have direct moral standing.
I do not mean by this that a suitably revised slippery
slope argument would make the contracting agents fear
that a theory which denied moral standing to animals
would be abused to deny standing to them as well.
This does not seem plausible. Rather, I have in mind
Carruthers' claim that to show that marginal humans
have direct standing one must merely show that the
contracting agents would have some reason to want
people to accept a moral theory which made such a
claim. For it seems that the direct moral standing of
animals could be established using precisely the same
strategy, and from considerations which Carruthers has
himself already endorsed.
Carruthers has argued, remember, that rational
agents will have reason to endorse the inculcation of a
sympathetic disposition toward animals in which the
actions of people who have the right sort of character
"are undertaken for the sake of the animals in question."
The contracting agents endorse the merits of such a
disposition because of its beneficial effects for other
people, it is true, but the disposition which they thereby
endorse nonetheless views animals as mattering for their
own sakes: "For this is what having the right kind of
sympathetic virtue consists in" (p. 154). Following our
discussion of marginal humans, then, we might initially
be tempted to say that rational agents would agree to a
set of moral principles on which when it is wrong to
harm an animal it is wrong because the animal has moral
standing, not because the rational agents believe that
animals merit such standing, but because they believe
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that it will be beneficial to humans to act on the
convenient belie/that animals have such standing. But,
if we accept Carruther's argument in the case of
marginal humans, we must conclude that to say that
rational agents would agree to principles which praise
those who view animals as having moral standing is
simply to say that rational agents would agree to accord
animals such standing, which is to say that on the
contractarian account animals have such standing.
Carruthers acknowledges that the person with the
sort of character which the rational agents will
recommend will be likely to think "that animal suffering
has moral standing, mattering for its own sake. For those
who have the right moral dispositions in this area will
act for the sake of the animal when prompted by feelings
of sympathy" (p. 157). But he insists that this would be
an "illusion" resulting from a failure to recognize that
there may be a variety of different levels to
moral thinking. On the one hand there is the
level of thought that manifests our settled
moral dispositions and attitudes (this is where
sympathy for animal suffering belongs), but
on the other hand there is the level of
theoretical reflection upon those dispositions
and attitudes, asking how they may bejustified
by an acceptable moral theory. It is at this level
that we come to realise, as contractualists, that
animals are without moral standing (p. 157).
But if this distinction justifies thinking of the moral
standing of animals as merely an "illusion" which it is
useful to cause people to fall into at the level of thought
that manifests their settled moral attitudes, then it must
equally justify thinking of the moral standing of
marginal humans as an illusion which it is useful to
agree to have people accept at the same level. At the
level of the moral beliefs which the contractarian thinks
that people ought to have, after all, marginal humans
are a matter of direct concern, but at the level of
theoretical reflection, the contractarian teaches that such
beliefs are justified solely on the grounds that they
benefit other rational agents, who seen from this
perspective are the only ones who are of direct concern.
I am not concerned here to insist that we must
therefore characterize animals as having direct moral
standing on the contractarian account. We mightjust as
naturally say that both they and marginal humans are
only of indirect concern, although in both cases rational
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Humana Press, 1983); "On a Case for Animal Rights," The
Monist Vol. 70, No.1 (January 1987».

agents agree that people have reason to see them as
objects of direct concern. The point is simply that the
two cases should stand or fall togeUler, so that in either
case, Carruthers has failed to provide a significant sense
in which all humans do, and all animals do not, have
"full" moral standing.

2 I use the terms "contractarianism" and "contractualism"
interchangeably.
3 It is worth noting that Raw Is himself resists the claim
that the contractarian model can be used to underwrite a
complete theory of morality. Even if it is extended beyond
justice to all of the social virtues, he acknowledges, "it would
seem to include only our relations with other persons and to
leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves toward
animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract
notion offers a way to approach these questions which are
certainly of the first importance" (Rawls, A Theory ofJustice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 17). It is
also worth noting that some have questioned whether the
contractors behind the veil of ignorance should be pennitted
to know what species they will belong to (see, e.g., Tom
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983), pp. 171-72. Carruthers offers a reply
to this concern at pp. 101-103).

v.
I have, throughout this paper, resisted commenting on
the merits of Carruthers' arguments for recognizing
minimal restrictions on our treatment of culimals, and I
will resist again in conclusion. For the point of tllis paper
has not been that those who seek to extend the moral
protection of animals beyond the levels presently
accorded them should abandon their conuniunent to
consequentialist or deontological moral theories and
instead embrace contractariculism as the most effective
way to further their cause. 1l1ere may well prove to be
good reasons to reject contractarianism as a moral
theory. The point has rather been Ulat there are people
who seek to deny further moral protection to CUlimalS
without lapsing into the unacceptable view that we have
no moral duties regarding animals at all, culd that
Carruthers presents contractarianism as a view that
furthers their cause. But this contractarian gcunbit, as
he develops it, ultimately runs aground on a dilemma:
either Carruthers' arguments for generating minimal
duties regarding animals fail, in which case the
contractarian theory must be rejected as unacceptably
counterintuitive, or his arguments succeed, in which
case they also generate moral judgments about our
treatment of animals which go substantially beyond
those presently accepted, bOtll in terms of their content
and in terms of the moral status they accord to llilimals.16

4 Impartiality is ensured by the fact that choices and
objections must be rational and by the stipulation that each
must share the aim of reaching free and unforced agreement
with others (p. 39).

5 Strictly speaking, there is a third argument grounded in
the likelihood that such agents would accept rules of private
property and would thus accept rules which would prevent
one person from harming animals which belonged to another.
But even Carruthers concedes that "an appeal to property
rights cannot take us very far in attempting to reconcile
contractualism with commonsense attitudes," (p. 106) so I
will pass over it without further comment.
6 Carruthers does not explicitly frame his argument in
terms of appeal to a best worst-case standard, and it might
plausibly be argued that such agents would instead appeal to
a utilitarian standard of maximizing the overall level of
preference satisfaction. But Carruthers is concerned to defend
contractarianism as an alternative to SUCll utilitarian standards,
and I take it that my construal of his position in tenns of agents
avoiding the worst-case outcome is the most plausible way
of understanding his attempt to do so.

Notes
1 Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral theory in
practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.
194, xii, 169. Parenthetical references in the text are to page
numbers in this book. I follow Carruthers here in using the
term "animal" to refer to nonhuman animals. It is worth noting
that CalTuthers is not the first to present moral contractualism
as a way of resisting such an extension of moral protection to
animals. His project is essentially the same as the one Jan
Narveson has pursued in a series of papers, although Narveson
is not mentioned in Carruthers' book (see, e.g., Narveson,
"Animal Rights," Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 7,
No. I (March 1977); "Animal Rights Revisited," in H. Miller
and W. Williams, eds., Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ:
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7 One might object that the benefits to some are substantial,
namely those who own stock in the companies who run the
factory farms. But this is misleading: if meat production were
morally prohibited, such people would simply invest their
money elsewhere. No one reasoning from behind the veil of
ignorance would have reason to suppose that he would make
more money in a market that included factory farming than
in one that did not, so no one will think there is a cost to him
in condemning such farming that is comparable to the cost to
the animal lover of permitting it.
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8 It might be objected that this argument would prove
ineffective against factory farming carried out in secret.
Since no animal lovers would be made aware of the suffering
caused to the animals, none would be caused any distress.
Some versions of contractarianism could block this move
directly by appealing to a publicity condition which would
rule out such secrecy, but it is not clear that such a response
is available on Carruthers' account. So it may be in principle
possible that the rational contractors would agree that factory
farming was permissible as long as it was carried out in
secret. It seems more likely, though, that such agents would
be deterred from this by the potentially great costs of
permitting such corporate secrecy (as discussed in section
IV below, Carruthers maintains that the contracting agents
must take into account not only what the rules they consider
permit, but how readily they might be abused). They would
therefore insist on the availability of public inspection of
farms, and thus while their moral principles might admit
the truth of the claim "if fanning practices could permissibly
be kept secret, then secret factory farming would be morally
permissible," they would at the same time render the
antecedent of the claim false. And if it is not permissible to
keep farming practices secret, then it is not permissible to
engage in factory farming in secret.

12 It might be suggested that this argument assumes that
the consumer is aware, at least at a general level, of the
suffering which animals must endure under such circumstances, and that it would therefore provide no basis for
criticizing the consumer of factory-farmed meat who is
blissfully ignorant of these conditions. This raises the
potentially thorny problem of what a moral contractarian
should say about the question of culpable ignorance, and I
cannot explore that issue in any detail here. It does seem
plausible, though, to suggest that our imagined contracting
agents would denounce the sort of person who makes no
effort at all to learn about conditions in the industries he
supports with his wallet (lest he inadvertently contribute to
the survival of a company which employs slave labor, for
example). And so if I am right to suggest that the
contractarian would insist on forbidding corporate secrecy
(see footnote 8 above), then he may well be left agreeing
with the claim that "if a factory-farm consumer's ignorance
of the farm's conditions reveals no defect of character, then
his purchasing of factory-farmed meat reveals no defect of
character," while maintaining that there are good reasons to
deny the truth of the claim's antecedent. So the consumer
will, on this account, be legitimately accused of indifference
to the suffering of animals, either because he knowingly
contributes to it for such trivial benefits, or because he cares
too little about it to obtain even the most generally accessible
information about it.

9 As Carruthers notes (pp. 157-58), this is the sort of
argument defended by Kant (in "Duties to Animals and
Spirits," in his Lectures on Ethics) and it goes back to medieval
scholastics such as Aquinas (e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book III, Part n, Chap. CXn) if not further; as Keith Thomas
has pointed out, the "ancient Athenians were said [by the
scholastics] to have condemned a child who blinded crows
because they thought that one day he would be cruel to men"
(Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the
Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p.
150; the relevant passages from Kant and Aquinas are both
reprinted in Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds.,Animal Rights
and Human Obligations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1989)).

13 Carruthers has harsher words in his preface: ''I regard
the present popular concern with animal rights in our culture
as a reflection of moral decadence" (xi).

14 It is possible, of course, that in launching this objection
Carruthers should be understood as stepping outside of his
contractarian framework, that his complaint is not that
contracting agents would fear a waste of moral energy if
they accept greater moral restrictions on the treatment of
animals but, rather, that in the world as things presently
stand, I will waste valuable moral energy ifllobby on behalf
of the welfare of animals. But if this is what Carruthers
means, then his observation does nothing to overturn my
suggestion that contracting agents would accept such
restrictions and would instead, if accepted, seem to show
onl y that I have some reason not to model my moral agenda
after the decisions that would be made by rational agents
behind a veil of ignorance.

10 This objection might be taken as merely one illustration
of a more general problem with Carruthers' argument.
Carruthers' argument rests on the general claim that whenever
a person is earning a living, that person is acting from
nontrivial motives. But we can imagine any number of trivial
motives a person might have for choosing one means of
earning a living over another. A person may go to work for a
certain company, for example, because he has a preference
for working for companies which advertise on even-numbered
pages in the phone book, but surely the fact that he makes a
living working for the company does not show that his motive
for doing so is not a trivial one.

15 Carruthers presents a second argument from the
desirability of social stability (pp. 117-18), but my response
is directed at the strategy which is used in both arguments, so
I will not treat that one separately.
16 I would like to thank David DeGrazia, Dale Jamieson,
Harlan B. Miller, Jon Mandie, Alec Walen and Sara Worley
for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

11 This supposition seems supported by the extremely high
turnover rate for such positions.
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